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Human Factors training is a major concern for airlines and Maintenance Repair 
Organizations. This study taps into the reservoir of knowledge and experience of 
retired Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) with respect to aviation 
maintenance human factors. A survey was given to retired AMTs with 20-30 
years of maintenance experience to rank the relative importance of each of the 
FAA’s Dirty Dozen of human factors in maintenance accidents.  Follow-up focus 
groups were conducted to further explore recommendations on how to prevent 
human factor accidents related to maintenance.  This paper discusses the findings 
from the original survey and preliminary findings from the first focus groups. 
 
As aircraft maintenance technicians conduct either scheduled or unscheduled 
maintenance, errors and mistakes occur.  According to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), about 80 percent of maintenance mistakes involve human factors (Adams, 2009).   The 
risk of experiencing more human error is a definite byproduct of a demanding maintenance work 
schedule.  How to prevent these airline maintenance related human factor induced errors from 
occurring is a continual challenge. Gordon Dupont developed the Dirty Dozen in his work with 
Transport Canada. The Dirty Dozen (Table 1) has been published in a series of safety posters 
along with discussions of available safety nets to provide a tool for training, for situational 
awareness, and as a checklist of human factors issues in aviation maintenance (Dupont, 1997). 
These posters continue to be used in aviation maintenance training and human factors awareness. 
 
Table 1.   
 
Gorden Dupont’s Dirty Dozen (Dupont, 1997) 
 
 
Most Common Causes of Maintenance Accidents
 
 
 
 Lack of Communications 
 Complacency 
 Pressure 
 Stress 
 Lack of Teamwork 
 Lack of Assertiveness 
 
 
 Norms 
 Lack of Knowledge 
 Lack of Resources 
 Fatigue 
 Distraction 
 Lack of Awareness 
 
 
 
 In 2006 and 2007, the FAA conducted two major surveys among aviation safety 
inspectors and the international maintenance community to determine human factors that 
required immediate attention. The survey focused on issues such as fatigue, training, leadership, 
error reporting, and documentation. The Dirty Dozen were presented to the safety inspectors to 
rank as challenges. “The top three were pressure, complacency, and norms” (Johnson & 
Hackworth, p.34)”. The FAA has a three day employee training course (Human Factors in 
Aviation Maintenance) that is now required. 
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) is another recent conceptual phenomenon 
that goes after the human side of accidents and has bled over into the various facets of the global 
aviation system (Taylor and Christensen, 1998). Its many applications are poignant and delve 
into the various aviation environments that are unique to the aircraft maintenance technician.  
MRM is part of the soft skills that have come to the forefront in the aviation and 
especially the airline maintenance business.  This concept allows employees to better understand 
their function within a company’s operation and its efforts to obtain a safe and error-free 
maintenance product.  One factor that increased attention on MRM was the ValuJet accident in 
1997 that resulted in more surveillance and sharpened focus on maintenance program 
requirements, as well as airworthiness responsibilities between operators and the third-party 
repair stations with which they outsource maintenance (Al-Amoudi, 1998).  
MRM, one of the best-kept industry secrets, is the newest tool in the airline maintenance 
management arsenal. The demand for this type of training became apparent following the Aloha 
Airlines flight on April 28, 1988, in which approximately 18 square feet of the upper cabin 
separated from the aircraft. Initial investigation of the accident revealed fatigue damage and 
disbanding of the metal structure that was in part caused by improper maintenance, inspection, 
and supervision. It was found that maintenance human factors may have played an important role 
in this accident (Gauntt, 2000). 
Airline maintenance complexes have very large and diverse personnel requirements that a 
MRM program can positively impact. Airlines have used MRM in training maintenance and 
ground personnel on how to recognize their own limitations, which, in turn, may affect or 
influence individual and team performance. The successful MRM programs have upper 
management support, training for all maintenance departments, continuous clear communication 
feedback, and a uniquely tailored MRM implementation plan.  
Several successful in-house programs were established with large commercial carriers 
such as Continental Airlines, US Airways, and United Airlines. Alteon (a Boeing Company 
affiliate) conducts free 2-day MRM seminars to airlines and any organizations who desire error-
reductions (Maynes, 2005).  If in-house MRM programs are not available to airlines, outside 
MRM contractors such as Grey Owl and Flight Safety International are two suppliers of such 
programs (Gauntt, 2000).    
 
A need exists to develop a more effective human factors training program based on real 
causes of aircraft maintenance accidents. In order to do this, the real-world views of experienced 
AMTs are necessary. We are losing a wealth of knowledge from AMT retirees that could be used 
 
 
to influence the next generation of human factor training programs. Steps need to be taken to 
capture this knowledge so that it can be incorporated into future training. If this is not done 
immediately, it will be lost forever, and future training will lack the valuable insight that the 
experience from this group could provide. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to describe the perceptions of retired aircraft maintenance 
workers concerning human factor causes of aircraft accidents (maintenance-related specifically). 
This was accomplished by first surveying retired AMTs concerning their views of the influence 
of various Human Factors (specifically the Dirty Dozen used by the FAA) in causing aircraft 
maintenance accidents. Two follow-up focus groups were conducted with selected AMTs to 
discuss the survey results and to describe in detail their views related to training on these issues.   
 
Methodology 
 
This is a descriptive study to provide a profile of the human factors perceptions of retired 
aircraft maintenance technicians. The population for this study was retired American Airlines 
Aircraft Maintenance Technicians who meet monthly at a Transport Workers Union (TWU) 
union hall. The group of TWU retiree association members normally has a 25-150 membership 
and they are on an average, age 55 and above, normally white, male, ex-worker with 5-30 years 
maintenance experience at American Airlines. Retirees normally meet monthly to keep up on 
issues affecting their retirement. It was at one of these normal monthly meetings that the initial 
survey was passed out.  
 
Initial data was collected through a short survey. Fifty surveys were handed out during a 
meeting of retired mechanics with 29 surveys completed. The goals of the survey were to 
identify participants for focus groups, and to discover how the AMTs would rank the importance 
of each of the Dirty Dozen based on their years of experience on the hangar floor. 
 
Two follow-up focus groups were chosen from among the survey participants who 
volunteered.  Questions presented to the focus group centered on the top four human factor 
causes. The focus group was asked about what these factors look like in the work environment 
and what strategies are or could be used to overcome these causes. Participants were also asked 
about human factor training and the good and bad techniques of the trainers. Results from the 
focus groups will be used to develop the next level of human factors training for maintenance 
workers at American Airlines. 
 
Research Questions 
The primary research questions for this study focused on how retired AMTs rank human 
factor causes of accidents using the FAA Dirty Dozen. Specifically, what strategies/safety nets 
do retirees believe should be used at the hangar floor to help prevent human factor causes of 
accidents? How do retirees feel about the development of the next phase of human factor 
training? What topics are important and relevant to the next generation of AMT training? 
 
 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
Preliminary results 
 
Survey results. Survey taken May 2010 showed that 90% of the respondents had 20 
years or more of aircraft maintenance experience. Participants were asked to choose the top four 
human factors problems from the Dirty Dozen list and place those selections in the High box, 
and then the least significant four in the Low box, and then the remaining four were then entered 
in the Medium Box. All responses were considered however only the four top responses in the 
High, Medium, and Low categories were noted in Table 2.  The numbers in each box indicate the 
total number of responses for each factor considered High, Medium, or Low.  Lack of 
Assertiveness made the top four for each the Medium and Low categories while Fatigue was in 
the top four for each the High and Medium categories. It is interesting to note that Lack of 
Communication and Complacency failed to make the top four in any category even though 
Complacency was in the top three items from the major FAA surveys mentioned earlier. 
 
Table 2.  
 
Categorize the “Dirty Dozen” human factor causes of maintenance-related accidents in terms of 
High, Medium and Low. 
 
High box Medium Box Low box 
Presssure-18 Lack of Resources-16 Lack of Teamwork-17 
Lack of knowledge-16 Lack of Assertiveness-13 Norms-16 
Distraction-15 Fatigue-12 Stress-12 
Fatigue- 14 Lack of Awareness-11 Lack of Assertiveness-12 
 
Note.  Only the four highest factors in each category were included which explains why the total 
don’t reflect all choices from the 29 participants. 
 
           Next, respondents ranked the Dirty Dozen inside the three categories of High, Medium, 
and Low (see Table 3). It is important to note that there are numerous differences between the 
results of the two questions. Ranking any set of items from 1 to 12 will inevitably result in a 
great deal of diversity based on personal experiences. Complacency was not considered a major 
influence for either ranking and that Fatigue, while in the top four in both the High and Medium 
box in Table 2,  it did not score high enough to be included in any of the boxes from Table 3. 
 
Table 3. 
 
Rank from highest to lowest the human factor cause inside the High, Medium, and Low Boxes. 
 
High Box Medium Box Low Box 
Lack of Awareness-8 Lack of Assertiveness-9 Lack of Communication-5 
Pressure -7 Lack of Resources-7 Norms-7 
Distraction-7 Pressure-9 Lack of Knowledge-4 
Lack of Teamwork-5 Lack of Teamwork-5  Stress-5 
 
 
 
           Focus Groups. On June 11, 2010, the first Focus Group met.  Four members were 
present.  All had twenty years or more experience with one individual the recipient of a golden 
wrench award (prestigious lifetime mechanic award winner). Other members of the group 
included an extensive variety of mechanic experience, consisting of three Quality Assurance 
inspectors, two line maintenance mechanics and one shop level mechanic.  
 
On June 17, 2010, the second Focus Group met. This focus group was based on the 
knowledge of investigator- awareness of recent past retirees. Four members were present with 
one member unable to participate due to medical problems. All participants had twenty years or 
more experience with one individual having being recently retired after working with the 
investigator for over fifteen years.  Maintenance experience of the group consisted of two 
Quality Assurance inspectors, two line maintenance mechanics, and one shop level mechanic. 
 
 
           Focus Group 1 comments included. 
 Pressure is external and can come from maintenance supervisors (foreman, your boss) 
who allow the aircraft maintenance schedule to override safety sometimes. 
 Fatigue caused by long hours, side jobs, inadequate sleep (off shift hours circadian 
system upset), overtime (needed and manufactured) and the extra effort of field trips.  
Mechanics are “burning the candle at both ends”.     
 Foremen suggest shortcuts to get the plane off and this sets the environment up for lack 
of knowledge 
 
           Focus Group 2 comments included. 
 Pressure is sometimes self-induced. Stress includes you wanting to do the best job and 
not wanting to mess it up.   
 Fatigue is the effect of not managing overtime rightly- “They worked 20 hour 
[shifts]…nobody twisted anybody’s arm [forced you to take overtime].” 
 Pressure might bring a lack of awareness. “I remember a supervisor [management] 
walking off the end of a wing.” 
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